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Summary
The thesis will focus on two economic topics. In the first part, large games are
studied. We will see it is easy to get the existence of equilibria when proper
probability spaces of player names are chosen. Our original contribution is
the characterization of equilibrium distribution in large games. Based on
the marriage theorem and the basic selection theorem, we first characterize
the equilibria in large games with countable action spaces. When the action
space is uncountable in the Lebesgue setting, a counterexample is constructed
to show the nonexistence of equilibria. Finally Loeb spaces are introduced as
the context of agent space, besides the richness of properties on Loeb spaces,
we show the characterization of equilibria.
The second part of the thesis concentrates on the asset pricing models.
Two of the most significant models are discussed - the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) and the arbitrage pricing model (APT). A Fubini extension is
formally introduced as a probability space that extends the usual probability
space and retains the Fubini property. Our prime result in this chapter is a
new factor model based on the model of Khan and Sun (2003), where the
joint asset and sample space are endowed with a Fubini extension.
1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Characterizing Equilibria in Large Games
The role of large games and their relevance for applications in the social
sciences has been recognized for decades. In this article, we mainly focus
on the characterization of the equilibrium distribution of such games. An
action distribution is called equilibrium distribution if it is induced by a Nash
equilibrium of the game. Our result is that a distribution is an equilibrium
distribution iff for any subset of actions the number of players who have a
best response in this subset is at least as large as the number of players
playing this subset of actions.
For large games with countable action spaces, we prove the the existence
and the characterization of equilibria. Sun(2000) has showed that for any
uncountable compact metric space A, one can always find a game with action
space A in lebesgue setting that has no Nash equilibrium. By this result we
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give a counterexample in large games with uncountable action spaces. The
construction of Loeb space is a breakthrough in nonstandard analysis. Many
results were discovered and proved in the area of probability theory and
mathematical economics. Sun(1996) extended his basic selection theorem
into the Loeb space, and with this extension, we can easily show the existence
as well as the characterization of equilibria.
Chapter 2 is organized as follows: section 2.1 is an introduction to our
model of large games. In section 2.2, we present the famous marriage theorem
and principle result in large games with countable actions. Then in section
2.3, we explore the case when the action space is uncountable. We give
a counterexample based on the Sun’s equilibrium theory in the Lebesgue
setting. The agent space is endowed with Loeb space in section 2.4, a brief
introduction of Loeb space is first given, followed by the prime distribution
properties on Loeb spaces and the characterizing result is presented in the
last subsection.
1.2 Asset Pricing in Large Asset Markets
The decomposition of risk has been studied for a long time of history. The
most two influential theories are the Capital asset pricing theory (CAPM)
and the Arbitrage pricing theory (APT).
In CAPM, a particular mean-variance efficient portfolio is singled out and
used as a formalization of essential risk in the market as a whole, as the ex-
pected return of an asset is linearly related to its normalized covariance with
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this market portfolio; the normalized covariance is called “beta covariance”
of the asset. The residual component in the total risk of a particular asset,
inessential risk, does not earn any positive return since it can eliminated by
another portfolio with an identical cost and return but with lower level of
risk. Its formal statement entails the following notation. A given asset i
has mean return µi and market portfolio has mean return µm and variance
σ2m. The covariance between the random return on asset i and the random
return on the market portfolio is σim, and the riskless rate of return is ρ. The
CAPM asserts that
µi = ρ+ τβi,
where
τ = µm − ρ and βi = σimupslopeσ2m
is the beta coefficient of asset i.
In Ross’s arbitrage pricing theory (APT), a given finite number of factors
are used as a formalization of systematic risks in the market as a whole, and
the expected return on an asset is approximately linearly related to its factor
loadings:
xi = µi + βi1f1 + ...+ βiKfK + ei, i = 1, 2, ... (1.1)
where the idiosyncratic disturbances ei are uncorrelated with each other
and with the factors fi.
The above condition implies that the covariance matrix may be decom-
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where BN is the N ×K matrix of factor loadings and DN is a diagonal
matrix.
Ross argued that the return on the residual component in the total risk of
a particular asset can be made arbitrage small simply by considering portfo-
lios with an arbitrarily large number of assets. He also showed the absence of
arbitrage opportunities in equilibrium implies (1.1) or its K-factor general-




(µi − ρ− τ1βi1 − ...− τKβiK)2 <∞.
Later in recent study of APT, Chamberlain and Rothchild (1983) pro-
posed a k-approximate structure. In this structure, the covariance matrix of
asset returns has only k unbounded eigenvalues when the number of assets
tends to infinity. It means that the covariance matrix may be decomposed






where BN are the N ×K matrices of factor loadings and RN is a sequence
of matrices with uniformly bounded eigenvectors.
Under this weak structure, the result keeps:
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∞∑
i=1
(µi − ρ− τ1βi1 − ..− τKβiK)2 <∞.
Based on the approximate structure, Khan and Sun (2003) developed a
version of APT on an asset index set of an arbitrary infinite cardinality. The
result is: ∑
i∈I
(µi − ρ− τ1βi1 − ...− τKβiK)2 <∞.
The result implies that in an arbitrary infinite numbers of assets (count-
able or uncountable), all but a countable number of them can be priced
exactly in terms of factors.
In chapter 3, we will deal with these asset pricing models. We also develop
a new asset pricing model based on Khan and Sun’s APT model, where the
joint asset and model are indexed by a Fubini extension. Some preliminaries
are presented in section 3.1, CAPM and APT are studied in section 3.2. In
section 3.3, we will give a brief introduction of Fubini extension. The last





2.1.1 Distribution of Correspondence
A correspondence is a mapping whose values are nonempty sets. Let F be
a correspondence from a probability space (T, T , λ) to a Polish space A. A
measurable mapping f : T → A is called a selection of F if f(t) ∈ F (t)
for λ-almost all t ∈ T . The correspondence F is said to be measurable if its
graph {(t, x) ∈ T×A : x ∈ F (t)} belongs to the product σ-algebra T ⊗B(A),
where B(A) denotes the Borel σ-algebra on A. It is well known that every
measurable correspondence has a selection . The correspondence F is said to
be closed (compact) valued if F (t) is a closed (compact) subset of A for all
t ∈ T . If F is closed valued, then the measurability of F as a correspondence
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is equivalent to the fact that F−1(O) is measurable for any open set O in A.
Note that for a set B in A, F−1(B) = {t ∈ T : F (t) ∩B 6= ∅}.
Let d be a metric on A. For a point x ∈ A and a nonempty subset B of A,
let the distance d(x,B) from the point x to the set B be inf{d(x, y) : y ∈ B}.
For nonempty subsets B and C of A, the Hausdorff distance ρ(C,B) between






Let FA be the hyperspace of nonempty closed subsets of A. When A is
compact, the metric space (FA, ρ) is also compact; moreover, for a compact
valued correspondence F from (T, T , λ) to A, the measurability of F as a
correspondence is equivalent to the measurability of F as a mapping into the
hyperspace (FA, ρ).
For a measurable mapping f from (T, T , λ) to A, we use λf−1 to denote
the Borel probability measure on A induced by f , which is often called the
distribution of f . LetM(A) be the space of Borel probability measures on X
endowed with the topology of weak convergence of measures. Note that this
topology on M(A) can also be induced by the Prohorov metricon M(A),
which is defined as
δ(ν1, ν2) = inf{² > 0 : ν1(E) ≤ ν2(B(E, ²)) + ²},
where the infimum is taken over all Borel measurable sets E in A, and for
any ² > 0, B(E, ²) = {x ∈ A : ∃y ∈ E, d(x, y) < ²}.
Definition 1 For a correspondence F from (T, T , λ) to A, let the distribu-
tion of F be given by DF = {λf−1 : f is a selection of F}.
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If the correspondence F is measurable, then standard results on the ex-
istence of selections guarantee that DF is nonempty.
2.1.2 Nash Equilibria in Large Games
A large game is a game with many players, which means either continuum
many players or a sequence of finite games with the number of player going
to infinity. We can use an atomless probability space (T, T , λ) to model the
ideal situation.
We shall now give a formal definition of a game based on a probability
space. Let A be a compact metric space, and UA the space of real-valued
continuous functions on (A×M(A)), endowed with its sup-norm topology. A
game G is a measurable function from (T, T , λ) to UA. Thus, a game simply
associates each player t ∈ T a payoff function G(t)(a, ν) which depends on the
player’s own action a and the distribution of actions by all the players. For
simplicity, we also use Gt to denote G(t). Bν(t) = {a ∈ A|Gt(a, ν) ≥ Gt(b, ν)
for all b ∈ A} is set of best responses for player t, aware of the distribution
ν ∈ M(A). By the compactness of A, Bν(t) is non-empty for every agent t.
Hence Bν defines a measurable correspondence from T to A. Now we turn
to the definition of Nash equilibria of large games.
Definition 2 A Nash equilibrium of game G is a measurable function g from
T to A such that for all t ∈ T , Gt(g(t), λg−1) ≥ Gt(a, λg−1) for all a ∈ A.
Thus, if g is a Nash equilibrium, then the distribution of actions by all
the players is λg−1 and every player chooses her optimal action g(t) under
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this societal distribution. Note that we only consider pure-strategy Nash
equilibria here.
In the following sections, we will show that it is easy to obtain the exis-
tence of equilibria when the game has a countable action space or Loeb agent
space. However, if the common unit Lebesgue interval is used, an explicit
example is constructed to show the nonexistence of equilibria.
2.2 Characterizing Equilibria for Countable
Action Spaces
2.2.1 Existence of Equilibria
Fixed-point theorems for correspondences have provided the standard tool
for showing the existence of economic equilibria in many areas of economics.
Before giving the the characterization of equilibria, we will first give a theo-
rem which shows the existence. Here we demonstrate how easy it is to obtain
the existence of Nash equilibria for games with general action spaces, once
the distribution theory for correspondences, is there. We simply adopt the
standard procedure for showing the existence of equilibria by verifying the
conditions of compactness, convexity and upper semicontinuity in the par-
ticular context. The following theorem states the existence of equilibria (See
Khan and Sun (1995)).
We now revert to the standing notation of Section 2.1 whereby (T, T , λ)
is an atomless probability space, and A a countable compact metric space.
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Let UA be the space of real-valued continuous functions on A ×M(A) en-
dowed with its sup-norm topology and with B(UA) its Borel σ-algebra. Let
T1, . . . , T`, be a partition of T with positive λ-measures c1, . . . , c`. For each
1 ≤ i ≤ m, we denote λi to be the probability measure on Ti such that for
any measurable set B ⊆ Ti, λi(B) = λ(B)/ci.
Theorem 1 Let G be a measurable map from T to UA. Then there exists a
measurable function f : T −→ A such that for λ-almost all t ∈ T,
ut(f(t), λ1f
−1
1 , · · · , λ`f−1` ) ≥ ut(a, λ1f−11 , · · · , λ`f−1` )
for all a ∈ A, where ut = G(t) ∈ UA and fi is the restriction of f to Ti.
Proof: Consider the mapping, in general set-valued, from T ×M(A)` into
A given by
(t, µ1, · · · , µ`) −→ F (t, µ1, · · · , µ`) = arg maxa∈Aut(a, µ1, · · · , µ`).
For each t ∈ T , the joint continuity of ut on A ×M(A)` implies the upper
semicontinuity of F (t, µ1, · · · , µ`) on M(A)`. In particular, for any given
(t, µ1, · · · , µ`), F (t, µ1, · · · , µ`) is a closed set. Furthermore, for each `-tuple
(µ1, · · · , µ`) ∈ M(A)`, since ut(·, µ1, · · · , µ`) is a measurable function on T,
and a continuous function on A, we can assert that ut is measurable in T×A,
and hence assert further that there exists a measurable selection from the
correspondence F(µ1,··· ,µ`).
Now for each 1 ≤ i ≤ `, define a correspondence F i from Ti ×M(A)`
to A by letting F i(t, µ1, · · · , µ`) = F (t, µ1, · · · , µ`) for each t ∈ Ti and
(µ1, · · · , µ`) ∈ M(A)`, where Ti is endowed with the probability measure
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λi. Consider the object DF i
(µ1,··· ,µ`)
. By the argument above, it is non-empty
and we can assert that it is convex and an upper semicontinuous correspon-
dence from M(A)` into M(A). Let G be the correspondence from M(A)`
to M(A)` such that for any tuple (µ1, · · · , µ`) ∈M(A)`,
G(µ1, · · · , µ`) = Π`i=1DF i(µ1,··· ,µ`) .
G is a closed and convex valued, upper semicontinuous correspondence.
Hence, we can apply the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem to assert the
existence of (µ?1, · · · , µ?`) ∈ G(µ?1, · · · , µ?`), and for each i, a measurable selec-
tion f ?i of F
i




i . Let f
? be the mapping from T
to A such that for each t ∈ Ti, f ?(t) = f ?i (t). It is clear f ? is an equilibrium.
In the next section, we will characterize the Nash equilibria by providing
the following neccessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium distribu-
tion : for any subset of actions C the number of players who have a best
response in C is at least as large as the number of players playing this subset
of actions. The proof relies on Hall’s marriage theorem (1935), Bollobas and
Varopoulos’s extension (1974) and Khan and Sun’s basic selection theorem
(1994). Now we begin with the statement of these theorems.
2.2.2 The Marriage Theorem and The Basic Selection
Theorem
The marriage theorem (1935), usually credited to mathematician Philip Hall,
is a combinatorial result that gives the condition allowing the selection of a
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distinct element from each of a collection of subsets.
The marriage problem requires us to match n girls with the set of n boys.
Each girl (after a long and no doubt exhausting deliberation) submits a list
of boys she likes. We also make an assumption that being of noble character
no boy will break a heart of a girl who likes him by turning her down. So,
although, girls appear to seize the initiative by advertising their preferences,
the situation is quite symmetric and is best represented by a zero-one matrix.
An element aij in row i and column j is 1 iff the marriage between the girl i
and the boy number j is feasible, aij is 0, otherwise. Sometimes all the girls
can be given away, sometimes no complete match is possible.
The marriage condition can be formulated in several equivalent ways:
(i) Every set of r girls, 1 ≤ r ≤ n likes at least r boys.
Pick up any s columns. Concentrate on rows that have at least one 1 in
the selected columns. The number of such rows must not be less than s.
(ii)Every set of s boys, 1 ≤ s ≤ n likes at least s girls.
Pick up any r rows. Concentrate on columns that have at least one 1 in
the selected rows. The number of such columns must not be less than r.
(iii) No zero r by s submatrix may satisfy r + s > n.
If such a matrix exists then some r girls can marry only (n − s) boys
outside the submatrix. Since r > n− s, there are just too few boys to satisfy
all r girls.
Theorem 2 Hall’s condition is both sufficient and necessary for a complete
match.
Proof: The necessecity is obvious. The sufficient part is shown by induc-
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tion. The case of n = 1 and a single pair liking each other requires a mere
technicality to arrange a match. Assume we have already established the
theorem for all k by k matrices with k < n. For the case of n girls and boys,
the marriage condition may be satisfied with room to spare or just barely.
In the first case, there is enough room for the first girl to marry whomever
she likes; the Hall’s condition will still be satisfied for the remaining (n− 1)
and (n− 1) boys. Indeed, every 0 < r < n girls like more than r boys. One
of those boys may have been the one who married the first girl - but without
whom there are still at least r boys. So, after marrying off any eligible pair
we shall be left with (n− 1)girls and boys for whom the marriage condition
still holds and, by the inductive hypothesis, complete match is possible.
In the second case, there are r < n girls who like exactly r boys. By the
inductive hypothesis, a complete match exists for these r girls so they can
be married to the r boys they like. The trick is to show that the remaining
girls can be matched to the remaining boys. Consider any s of the remaining
n− r girls. The r married girls plus these s girls must like at least r+ s boys
as assured by Hall’s condition. Since the r married girls don’t like boys other
than the r they married, the s girls must like s boys other than the married
boys. Hence the remaining n − r girls satisfy the marriage condition with
the unmarried boys; and so a complete match is possible for the remaining
girls with the remaining boys, providing a complete match for all the girls.
This completing the proof.
Now we give a special case of the principle result of Bollobas and Varopou-
los (1974), which is the extension of the marriage theorem, in terms of our
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notation.
Definition 3 Let (Tα)α∈I be a family of sets in T , and Λ = (τα)α∈I be a
family of non-negative numbers, I a countable index set. We say that (Tα)α∈I
is Λ-representable if there is a family (Sα)α∈I of sets in T such that for all
α, β ∈ I, α 6= β, one has
(i) Sα ⊆ Tα,
(ii) λ(Sα) = τα,
(iii) Sα ∩ Sβ = ∅.








for all finite subsets IF of I.
Our next result presents Khan and Sun’s basic selection theorem (1994).
Theorem 4 If F is measurable and τ ∈ A, then τ ∈ DF if and only if for
all finite B ⊆ A, λ(F−1(B)) ≥ τ(B).
Proof: If τ ∈ DF , then there is a measurable selection f of F such that
λf−1 = τ . Thus for any finite B ⊆ A,
τ(B) = λ(f−1(B)) = λ({t ∈ T : f(t) ∈ B})
≤ λ({t ∈ T : F (t) ∩B 6= ∅}).
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We turn to the less straightforward converse. For each i ∈ IN, let Ti ≡
{t ∈ T : ai ∈ F (t)}, and observe that F−1(∪i∈I{ai}) = ∪i∈ITi for any finite
I ⊆ IN. Let τi = τ({ai}). Hence by hypothesis, λ(∪i∈ITi) ≥
∑
i∈I τi, and
we can apply the Theorem 3 to assert that there exist, for all i ∈ IN, Si ⊆
Ti, λ(Si) = τi, Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for all j 6= i.
Now define a measurable function f : T −→ A such that for all i ∈ IN
and for all t ∈ Si, f(t) = ai. Since, for any
i ∈ IN, t ∈ Si =⇒ ai ∈ F (t) =⇒ f(t) ∈ F (t),
and that furthermore, λ(f−1({ai})) = λ(Si) = τi and λ(∪i∈INSi) = 1, f is
the required selection.
2.2.3 Characterization of Equilibria
With the above theorems we can give our main result for large games with
countable actions :
Theorem 5 In a large game G, suppose that action space A is a countable
compact metric space and agent space T is endowed with Lebesgue measure λ,
then τ ∈M(A) is an equilibrium distribution iff for any subset C of actions
the number λ(B−1τ (C)) of players with a best response in C is no less than
the number τ(C)of players playing actions C. i.e.,
τ ∈ M(A) is an equilibrium distribution iff for any finite subset C of A,
λ(B−1τ (C)) ≥ τ(C).
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The proof will be quite straightforward when we use Theorem 4 above.
Proof of the theorem:
Define DBτ = {λf−1 : f is a measurable selection of Bτ}.
(=⇒) Let τ ∈ M(A) be an equilibrium. By definition, τ = λf−1 for
some action profile f with f(t) ∈ Bτ (t) for λ-almost all t. Note that f is
a measurable selection of Bτ , τ ∈ DBτ . By Theorem 4, τ ∈ DBτ implies
λ(B−1τ (C)) ≥ τ(C) for any finite subset C of A. In other words, if τ is an
equilibrium, then λ(B−1τ (C)) ≥ τ(C) for any finite subset C of A.
(⇐=) Let τ be a distribution in M(A) such that λ(B−1τ (C)) ≥ τ(C) for
any finite subset C of A. By Theorem 4, τ ∈ DBτ . That is, τ = λf−1
for some measurable selection f of Bτ . Hence f(t) ∈ Bτ (t) for λ-almost all
t ∈ T . τ is thus an equilibrium.
2.3 Counterexamples
The purpose of this subsection is to show that when the action space A
in Theorem 5 is replaced by a general compact metric action space, the
sufficiency can fail.
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2.3.1 Nonexistence of Nash Equilibria in Lebesgue Set-
ting
We first give a countexample to show that for any uncountable compact
metric space A, one can always find a game with action space A in the
Lebesgue setting which has no Nash equilibrium.




a/2 for 0 ≤ a ≤ (`/2)
(`− a)/2 for(`/2) ≤ a ≤ `
−g(a− `, `) for ` ≤ a ≤ 2`.
Note that g(·, `) is also an odd function, i.e., g(x, `) = −g(−x, `) for x < 0.
When ` = 0, we simply let g(x, `) ≡ 0. It is easy to check that g(·, ·) is jointly
continuous on [−1, 1]× [0, 1].
Now consider a game G1 in which the space of player names is the unit
interval T = [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure τ , and the action set A is the
interval [−1, 1]. Let the payoff function G1t of any player t ∈ [0, 1] be given
by
G1t (a, ν) = h(a, ν)− |t− |a||,
where h(a, ν) = g(a, βδ(ν, τ ∗)), β a number in the open interval (0, 1), and
δ(ν, τ ∗) the distance between ν and the uniform probability measure τ ∗ on
[−1, 1] under the Prohorov metric. Here the Prohorov metric is defined from
the natural metric |x − y| on underlying space [−1, 1]. It is thus clear that
δ(ν, τ ∗) ≤ 1. Note that G1 is not only measurable but also continuous from
T into UA.
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The following theorem (see Sun(2000)) proves that the above example
has no Nash equlibrium.
Theorem 6 The game G1 has no Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium f for game G1. Let ν0 be τf−1,
the distribution on [−1, 1] induced by f . If ν0 is the uniform distribution
τ ∗ on [−1, 1], then δ(ν0, τ ∗) = 0. Thus, for a ∈ [−1, 1], h(a, ν0) = 0, and
hence G1t (a, ν0) = −|t− |a||. This means that the best response for player t
is to choose −t or t. Therefore, the equilibrium f must be a selection of the
correspondence F in the above example whose distribution is τ ∗. This is a
contradiction.
Thus, we must have 0 < δ(ν0, τ
∗) ≤ 1. Denote βδ(ν0, τ ∗) by `0. Consider
the case t ∈ ((k − 1)`0, k`0) for an odd positive integer k. This means that
g(t, `0) > 0. Note that the payoff for player t is
G1t (a, ν0) = h(a, ν0)− |t− |a|| = g(a, `0)− |t− |a||.
By the fact that g(·, `) is Lipschitz continuous of modulus 1/2, we can obtain
that for each a in the interval [0, 1]− {t},
G1t (a, ν0)− G1t (t, ν0) = g(a, `0)− g(t, `0)− |t− |a|| ≤ −|t− a|/2 < 0. (2.1)
Next take a ∈ [−1, 0). If g(a, `0) ≤ 0, then the fact that −g(t, `0) < 0 and
−|t − |a|| ≤ 0 implies that g(a, `0) − g(t, `0) − |t − |a|| < 0. If g(a, `0) > 0,
then g(|a|, `0) = −g(a, `0) < 0. Thus there is a number c between t and |a|
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such that g(c, `0) = 0, and hence
g(a, `0)− g(t, `0) = −g(|a|, `0)− g(t, `0)
= g(c, `0)− g(|a|, `0) + g(c, `0)− g(t, `0)
≤ ||a| − c| /2 + |c− t| /2 < |t− |a||.
Therefore, we can conclude that G1t (a, ν0) < G1t (t, ν0) for any a ∈ [−1, 1] with
a 6= t. This means that the unique optimal action for player t is t. Since f
is a Nash equilibrium, f(t) must be an optimal action for player t. Hence,
f(t) = t. A similar argument shows that f(t) = −t when t ∈ ((k− 1)`0, k`0)
for an even positive integer k. Thus we obtain that f(t) = (−1)k−1t for
t 6= m`0,m ∈ N .
It is clear that the support S of ν0 oscillates between intervals of length
`0, moving outwards from the origin in both directions, and on the support,
ν0 is the same as the Lebesgue measure. We shall show that the Prohorov
distance δ(ν0, τ
∗) is at most `0. In particular, we check that for any Borel
set E in [−1, 1], ν0(E) ≤ τ ∗(B(E, ²) + ² for any ² > `0. Without loss of
generality, assume E to be a Borel subset of S which does not contain any
endpoints of the subintervals in S. List the subintervals in S as S1, S2, · · · , Sm
in an increasing order, with S1 or Sm possibly of length less than `0. Let
Ei = E ∩ Si. Then Ei + `0 is a subset of the open subinterval with length
`0 on right of Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 (note that Sm may not be followed by a
subinterval of length `0). It is clear that all the Ei, Ei+ `0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
are disjoint and also their union is a subset of B(E, ²). Since τ(Em) ≤ `0
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(τ ∗(Ei) + τ ∗(Ei + `0)) + `0 ≤ τ ∗ (B(E, ²)) + ².
Hence δ(ν0, τ
∗) ≤ `0.
Finally, we recall the definition of `0 = βδ(ν0, τ
∗). Thus δ(ν0, τ ∗) ≤
βδ(ν0, τ
∗), which implies β ≥ 1. This contradicts the original choice of β in
the open interval (0, 1). Therefore the game G1 has no Nash equilibrium.
2.3.2 A Counterexample for Characterizing Equilibria
in Theorem 5
Following the method above we construct a large game Γ in which the space
of player names is the Lebesgue unit interval T = [0, 1], and the action set
A is the interval [-1,1]. Here we consider the uniform distribution on [-1,1],
denoted by τ ∗.
Let player i’s payoff function be ut(a, τ
∗) = −|t− |a||,
Then it is obvious that the best response set for player i is :
Bτ∗(t) = {a ∈ A|ut(a, τ ∗) ≥ ut(b, τ ∗) ∀ b ∈ A}= {t, -t}.
Let C be any Borel set in A, C = C1 ∪ C2, C1 ⊂ (0, 1] and C2 ⊂ [−1, 0].
Then we have
λ(B−1τ∗ (t)) = λ({t ∈ T | C ∩Bτ (t) 6= ∅})
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therefore, λ(B−1τ∗ (t)) ≥ λ(C1)+λ(C2)2 = τ ∗(C).
Next we prove that τ ∗ cannot be an equilibrium distribution, i.e., there
is no such f being a measurable selection of Bτ (t), s.t. λf
−1 = τ ∗ and
f(t) ∈ Bτ∗(t) for almost all t ∈ T .
Suppose τ ∗ is an equilibrium distribution, by definition f(t) ∈ Bτ∗(t) ,
then there exists H ⊆ (0, 1] , such that
f(t) =
 t t ∈ H−t t /∈ H.
Hence, λ(H) = λf−1(H) = τ ∗(H) = λ(H)
2
This is a contradiction.
2.4 Agent Spaces Endowed with Loeb Mea-
sure
In this part we restrict our attention to a correspondence F on a Loeb space
instead of considering correspondences on a general probability space. By
setting this, we can obtain many regular properties, including closedness,
convexity, compactness, purification and semi-continuity.
2.4.1 Loeb Spaces
First we will give a brief introduction of Loeb space (interested readers can
refer to Hurd and Loeb (1985) and Khan and Sun (1997) ), which is a break-
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through in the history of nonstandard analysis. From then on, nonstandard
analysis were carried on in the area of probability thoery and mathematical
economics.
To state the main results, we first fix some notation. Let Ω be a nonempty
internal set, A an internal algebra of subsets of Ω, and P a finitely additive
internal probability measure on (Ω,A). Define a real valued set function ◦P
on (Ω,A) such that for each A ∈ A, ◦P (A) is the standard part ◦(P (A)) of
P (A). By Loeb’s theorem, ◦P can be extended to a probability measure L(P )
on the σ-algebra generated by A. Let (Ω, L(A), L(P )) be the completion of
the space (Ω, σ(A), L(P )). This completion is usually refereed to as the Loeb
space.
We shall use (Ω,A, P ) as our sample sapce. Let (T, T , λ) be another Loeb
space which is used as our index space, for example, as a parameter space
of a set of random variables or correspondences, or as the space of economic
agents. Both Loeb spaces considered here are assumed to be atomless. With
these two probability spaces in hand, we can take their product space called
the Loeb product spaces. Let (T ×Ω, L(T ⊗A), L(λ⊗P )) be a Loeb product
space, which is a standard probability space itself. An advantage for adopting
such a kind of product spaces is that except for trival cases, the processes
considered here are not measurable with ragard to the usual product σ-
algebra L(T ) ⊗ L(A), but to the Loeb product σ-algebra that is strictly
bigger than the former. In fact, the main technical strength of the work
relies in this larger measure-theoretic framework. The Loeb space have all the
desired properties, which is rich enough for the solution of the measurability
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problem. More over, as first shown by Keisler, the Fubini property also holds
in Loeb space.
Below is the Keisler’s Fubini property (1972) for Loeb spaces:
Proposition 1 Let f be a real-valued integrable function on the Loeb product
space(T × Ω, L(T ⊗ A), L(λ⊗ P )). Then:
(i)For almost all t ∈ T , f(t, .) is Loeb integrable on Ω.
(ii)The function g(t) =
∫
f(t, ω)dω is Loeb integrable on T.
(iii)
∫





2.4.2 Distribution Properties of Correspondence on Loeb
Spaces
Let F be a correspondence from (Ω, L(A), L(P )) to a Polish space X. Re-
call that F is said to be closed valued if for every ω ∈ Ω, F (ω) is a closed
subset of X. We are now ready to state the five theorems of the distribu-
tion properties of correspondence on Loeb space(See Sun(1996)). The first
theorem says that the set of distributions of the measurable selections of a
closed valued correspondence is still closed. Note that here F is not assumed
to be measurable. Then our definitions of correspondence in section 2.1 can
be extended to Loeb space.
Theorem 7 If F is closed valued, then DF is closed in the space M(X).
The next theorem establishes the convexity of the set of distributions of
the measurable selections of a correspondence on an atomless Loeb space.
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Note that the correspondence is not required to be measurable or closed
valued.
Theorem 8 Given the correspondence F , if the Loeb space (Ω, L(A), L(P ))
is atomless, then DF is convex.
In decision theory, control theory, and the calculus of variations, a certain
relaxation of the usual concept of solutions is needed to ensure the existence
of generalized solutions for some problems. To achieve a convexification of
the original problems, one can, instead of working on measurable functions
into a Polish space X, look for solutions of the problems as measurable func-
tions from a probability space into the spaceM(X) of probability measures
on X. These solutions are variously termed random probabilities, transition
probabilities, random decision rules, and relaxed controls. The following the-
orem roughly says that if one is given a relaxed solution, then a solution in
the classical sense (also called the purified solution) with the same distri-
bution can be found, which is a measurable selection of a correspondence
closely associated to the original relaxed solution. Thus we have a general
result on purification.
Theorem 9 Assume that the Loeb space (Ω, L(A), L(P )) is atomless and
G a measurable mapping from (Ω, L(A)) to the space M(X) of probability
measures on X. Then there is a measurable mapping f from (Ω, L(A)) to X
such that
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(1) for each ω ∈ Ω, f(ω) ∈ suppG(ω), where suppG(ω) is the support of
the probability measure G(ω) on X,




Next we turn to the compactness of DF .
Definition 4 Let G be a correspondence from a probability space (T, T , ν)
to a Polish space X. We say that G is a tight correspondence if for every
ε > 0, there is a compact set Kε in X such that the set {ω : G(ω) ⊆ Kε} is
measurable and its measure is greater than 1− ε.
Theorem 10 If F is compact valued or F is closed valued and tight, then
DF is compact. Conversely, if F is measurable and DF is compact, then F
is tight.
Finally we come to the property that the process of taking distributions
preserves semicontinuity.
Definition 5 Let G be a correspondence from a topological space Y to an-
other topological space Z. Let y0 be a point in Y . Then G is said to be upper
semicontinuous at y0 if for any open set U which contains G(y0), there exists
a neighborhood V of y0 such that y ∈ V implies that G(y) ⊆ U . G is said
to be lower semicontinuous at y0 if for any open set U with G(y0) ∩ U 6= ∅,
there exists a neighborhood V of y0 such that G(y) ∩ U 6= ∅ for every y ∈ V .
G is said to be continuous at y0 if it is both upper and lower semicontinuous
at y0.
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We still work on a Loeb probability space (Ω, L(A), L(P )). Let Y be a
metric space and F a correspondence from Ω × Y to the Polish space X.
Then for each fixed y ∈ Y , F (·, y) defines a correspondence on Ω, which is
denoted by Fy.
Theorem 11 Assume that for each fixed y ∈ Y , F (·, y) is a closed valued
measurable correspondence from Ω to X and there is a compact valued cor-
respondence G from Ω to X such that for every y ∈ Y , F (ω, y) ⊆ G(ω) for
all ω ∈ Ω. Then if for each fixed ω ∈ Ω, F (ω, ·) is upper semicontinuous on
the metric space Y , then DFy is upper semicontinuous on Y ; if for each fixed
ω ∈ Ω, F (ω, ·) is lower semicontinuous on Y , then DFy is lower semicontin-
uous on Y ; and if F (ω, ·) is continuous on Y for each fixed ω, then DFy is
continuous on Y .
2.4.3 Existence of Equilibria
Based on the richness of Loeb spaces, we show the existence of equilibria by
the following theorem (See Sun(2000)) when we let an atomless hyperfinite
Loeb space (T, Lλ(T ), λL) be the space of player names.
Theorem 12 Let game G be a measurable function from an atomless hyper-
finite Loeb space (T, Lλ(T ), λL) to the space UA of payoffs, where the action
space A is a compact metric space. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium for
the game G.
Proof: Define a correspondence F from T×M(A) to A such that for any
(t, ν) ∈ T ×M(A), F (t, ν) is the set of all elements a ∈ A which maximizes
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the function Gt(a, ν) on A. That is, F (t, ν) = Arg Maxa∈AGt(a, ν). It is
clear that F is compact valued. For each t ∈ T , since Gt is continuous
on A ×M(A), it is easy to see that the correspondence Ft = F (t, ·) from
M(A) toM(A) has a closed graph, i.e., it is upper semicontinuous onM(A).
Furthermore, for each ν ∈ M(A), since Gt(·, ν) is a measurable function on
T, and a continuous function on A, the correspondence Fν = F (·, ν) from T
to A is measurable (see Casting and Valadier (1977)). Hence there exists a
selection for Fν , i.e., DFν 6= ∅. Thus G(ν) = DFν defines a correspondence
from M(A) to M(A).
Since the hyperfinite Loeb space is assumed to be atomless, which implies
that G is convex valued. And we can assert that G is also compact valued
and upper semicontinuous. Hence, we can get the existence of ν? ∈ G(ν?),
and a selection f ? of Fν? such that λL(f
?)−1 = ν?. By modifying the values
of f ? on a null set, we can require f ?(t) ∈ Fν?(t) for every t. It is then clear
that f ? is a Nash equilibrium.
In contrast to the use of distributions, integrals are also used as soci-
etal responses in the economic literature. It is also straightforward to ob-
tain the existence of Nash equilibria in an integral setting from the dis-
tributional form in Theorem 12. Here we give some details. Let the ac-
tion set A be a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach space. The
space UwA of player payoff functions is the space of weakly continuous real-
valued functions on A×con (A) endowed with the sup-norm topology, where
con (A) is the closed convex hull of A. If G is a measurable mapping from
(T, Lλ(T ), λL) to UwA , then define a new mapping G ′ from T to UA such that
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G ′t(a, ν) = Gt(a,
∫
x∈A xdν), where the integral is interpreted as the Bochner
integral. Since the operator L(ν) =
∫
x∈A xdν(x) is continuous, G ′ indeed
defines a measurable mapping from T to UA, and hence Theorem 12 implies
the existence of a Nash equilibrium f for the game G ′. It is obvious that f
is also a Nash equilibrium for the game G.
2.4.4 Characterization of Equilibria
Now we will explore the case when the agent space is endowed with Loeb
measure. The proof is a direct application of the proposition of Sun (1993)
below.
Proposition 2 Let F be a closed valued measurable correspondence from an
atomless Loeb probability space (Ω, L(A), L(P )) to a Polish space X. Let µ
be a Borel probability measure on X. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) there is a measurable selection f of F such that L(P )f−1 = µ;
(ii) for every Borel set A in X, µ(A) ≤ L(P )(F−1(A));
(iii) for every closed set B in X, µ(B) ≤ L(P )(F−1(B));
(iv) for every open set O in X, µ(O) ≤ L(P )(F−1(O)).
Proof: For (i)⇒ (ii), let f be a Loeb measurable function from Ω to X
such that f(ω) ∈ F (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Let A be a Borel set in X. Then for
any ω ∈ f−1(A), f(ω) ∈ A ∩ F (ω), which implies that A ∩ F (ω) 6= ∅. Thus
f−1(A) ⊆ F−1(A), and hence
µ(A) = L(P )(f−1(A)) ≤ L(P )(F−1(A)).
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It is clear that (ii) ⇒ (iii).
To prove (iii) ⇒ (iv), let O be an open set in X. Then there is an




each n, we have F−1(Bn) ⊆ F−1(O), which implies that
µ(Bn) ≤ L(P )(F−1(Bn)) ≤ L(P )(F−1(O)).
Hence
µ(O) ≤ L(P )(F−1(O)).
It remains to show (iv) ⇒ (i). Let d be a metric on the Polish space
X. For an x ∈ X and a r ∈ IR+, let B(x, r) = {y : d(y, x) < r} and
S(x, r) = {y : d(y, x) = r}. We shall first fix an n ≥ 1. Then there
is a compact set Cn in X such that µ(Cn) > 1 − 1/n. For every point
x in Cn, choose 0 < rx < 1/n such that the sphere S(x, rx) is a µ-null
set. There are finitely many points x1, x2, ..., xhn in Cn such that the open
balls B(x1, rx1), ..., B(xhn , rxhn ) cover Cn. Denote rxi = ri for each i. Let
An0 = X −
hn∪
i=1
B(xi, ri) and A
n
k = B(xk, rk) −
k−1∪
i=1
B(xi, ri) for 1 ≤ k ≤ hn.
Then for each fixed n ≥ 1, the Ani ’s form a partition of X. It is clear that
for each 0 ≤ k ≤ hn, Ank is a µ-continuous set. Note that for a µ-continuous
set A with interior B,
L(P )(F−1(A)) ≥ L(P )(F−1(B)) ≥ µ(B) ≥ µ(A)− µ(∂A) = µ(A)
Let Ωni = F
−1(Ani ) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ hn. Since for any finite set I ⊆
{0, 1, ..., hn}, the set ∪
i∈I
Ani is still µ-continuous, we have
L(P )( ∪
i∈I
Ωni ) = L(P )(F
−1( ∪
i∈I
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Hence there exists a partition {Sni }hni=0 of Ω such that Sni ⊆ Ωni and L(P )(Sni ) =
µ(Ani ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ hn. Let Fi be a correspondence on the measurable space
(Sni , L(A) ∩ Sni ) defined by Fi(ω) = F (ω) ∩ Ani . Then the graph of Fi is
the intersection of the graph of F with Sni ×Ani , which is measurable in the
product σ-algebra (L(A) ∩ Sni )⊗ B(Ani ).
Since Ani is still a Polish space, it follows that there exists a measurable
selection ϕi of Fi. Define fn on Ω such that fn(ω) = ϕi(ω) for ω ∈ Sni .
Let µn = L(P ) f
−1
n . For any given Borel set A in X, let J = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤
hn, A ∩ Ani 6= ∅}. Then we have
µn(A) = µn(A ∩ An0 ) + µn( ∪
i∈J
A ∩ Ani )






















Since µ(An0 ) < 1/n and ∪
i∈J
Ani ⊆ B(A, 1/n) = {y ∈ X : ∃x ∈ A, d(x, y) <
1/n}, we have
µn(A) < 1/n+ µ(B(A, 1/n)).
Hence by a definition of the Prohorov metric δ on M(X) , we can conclude
that δ(µn, µ) ≤ 1/n. Thus {µn}∞n=1 converges weakly to µ on X. Since for
each n ≥ 1, fn is also a measurable selection of F , we have µn ∈ DF . By
Theorem 7, µ ∈ DF , and so we are done.
Now we can give our main result for large games with Loeb agent spaces:
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Theorem 13 In a large game G, let the agent space (T, L(T ), L(λ)) be an
atomless Loeb probability space and the action space A a compact metric
space. Then τ ∈ M(A) is an equilibrium distribution iff for one of the
following three equivalent conditions satisfies:
(i) for every Borel set C in A, L(λ)(B−1τ (C)) ≥ τ(C).
(ii) for every closed set F in A, L(λ)(B−1τ (F )) ≥ τ(F ).
(iii) for every open set O in A, L(λ)(B−1τ (O)) ≥ τ(O).
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Chapter 3
Asset Pricing in Large Asset
Markets
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 No Arbitrage Assumption
In economics and finance, arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of a
price differential between two or more markets: a combination of matching
deals are struck that capitalize upon the imbalance, the profit being the
difference between the market prices; in simple terms, a risk-free profit. A
person who engages in arbitrage is called an arbitrageur.
Let us consider a stock that is traded on both the New York Stock
Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. Suppose that the stock price
is $172 in New York and £100 in London at a time when the exchange
rate is $1.7500 per pound. An arbitrageur could simultaneously buy 100
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shares of the stock in New York and sell them to obtain a risk-free profit
of 100 ∗ [($1.75 ∗ 100) − $172] or $300 in the absence of transactions costs.
Transactions costs would probably eliminate the profit for a small investor.
However, a large investment bank faces very low transactions costs in both
the stock market and the foreign exchange market. It would find the arbi-
trage opportunity very attractive and would try to take as much advantages
of it as possible.
However, arbitrage opportunities such as the one just described cannot
last for long. As arbitrageurs buy the stock in New York, the forces of
supply and demand will cause the dollar price to rise. Similarly, as they sell
the stock in London, the sterling price will be driven down. Very quickly
the two prices will become equivalent at the current exchange rate. Indeed,
the existence of profit-hungry arbitrageurs makes it unlikely that a major
disparity between the sterling price and the dollar price could ever exist in the
first place. Generalizing from this example, we can say that the very existence
of arbitrageurs means that in practice only very small arbitrage opportunities
are observed in the prices that are quoted in most financial markets. So
in reality most of the arguments concerning futures prices, forward prices,
and the values of option contracts will be based on the assumption that no
arbitrage opportunities exist. Thus,
“Assuming no arbitrage is compelling because the presence of arbitrage is
inconsistent with equilibrium when preferences increase with quantity. More
fundamentally, the presence of arbitrage is inconsistent with the existence of
an optimal portfolio strategy for any competitive agent who prefers more to
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less, because there is no limit to the scale at which an individual would want
to hold the arbitrage position. Therefore, in principle, absence of arbitrage
follows from individual rationality of a single agent. One appeal of results
based on the absence of arbitrage is the intuition that few rational agents
are needed to bid away arbitrage opportunities, even in the presence of a sea
of agents driven by ‘animal spirits’.” (Dybvig and Ross, 1987)
Now we can give a formal mathematical definition of “no arbitrage op-
portunities”. Let’s first fix some notations. Let the financial market consist
of asset indexed by i ∈ I, where the index set I is an infinite set. Thus we
work with a countably infinite or an uncountably infinite number of assets.
For each i ∈ I, let xi be the random one period of return to a dollar invested
in the asset i, and as such, each asset has a unit cost. Each xi is assumed
to have a finite second moment; and its mean and variance are denoted by
µi and V (xi). For simplicity, we also assume that there is a riskless asset s
with a positive return ρ, and we let s be one of the random variables xi. For
any random variables x and y, let cov(x, y) be the covariance of x and y.
Definition 6 Let {pn} be a sequence of finite portfolios. Then the market is
said to permit no arbitrage opportunities if the following two conditions hold:
(i) If V (pn)→ 0 and C(pn)→ 0, then E(pn)→ 0.
(ii) If V (pn)→ 0, C(pn)→ 1, and E(pn)→ α, then α > 0.
Condition (i) simply excludes the existence of such portfolio that is cost-
less, riskless but still yields a positive return. Otherwise, most of the risk-
averse traders will want to buy arbitrarily large amounts of that portfolio,
and break the equilibrium of the market consequently.
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Condition (ii) is warranted by the similar reason. Suppose (ii) does not
hold, i.e., α ≤ 0. Then by creating the portfolio in the short position, i.e.,
selling the portfolio, investors can earn, without budget constraint, arbitrar-
ily large amounts of cash which can be used to purchase investments or, in a
complete model, for current consumption, while incurring no future obliga-
tions. In the case of α < 0, they could even consume the market both now
and in the future without risk.
The continuity of E is self-evident. Since ‖ p ‖2= V (p) + E2(p). Hence,
if ‖ pn ‖→ 0, then E(pn)→ 0.
From the above we can get the continuity of C.
Proposition 3 No arbitrage assumptions implied that C() is continuous.
Proof: Suppose {pn} converges to zero but that C(pn) does not converge
to zero. Then there exists ε > 0 and subsequence {pn′} with | C(pn′) |> ε
for all n′. Let qn′ = pn′/C(pn′). Then along with the subsequence we have
C(qn′) = 1 and
‖ qn′ ‖=‖ pn′ ‖ / | C(pn′) |≤‖ pn′ ‖ /ε→ 0
Thus, by the definition of this associated norm, both V (qn′) and E(qn′)
converge to zero, which contradicts Condition (ii) and completes the proof
of the claim.
3.1.2 APT on a Fubini Extension
In 1983, Chamberlain and Rothchild made a progress by proposing a K-
approximate factor structure where the covariance matrix of asset returns
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has only K unbounded eigenvalues as the number of assets tends to infinity
for a market with countably many assets. Additionally, asset returns are
viewed as elements of a suitable Hilbert space. The no-arbitrage condition is
shown to imply the continuity of the cost functional on portfolio returns by
the assets, which is a very important result for later use.
However, despite several attempts, the intuitive notion of a “well-diversified”
portfolio has resisted a rigorous and precise treatment. In fact, Chamberlain-
Rothschild flatly state (1983) , “Ross’ heuristics cannot be made rigorous”.
In 1997, Khan and Sun offered an APT theory of considerable scope and
power that not only dispels these, and other, misgivings, but also allows us
to uncover concepts that have so far been missed in the literature. In partic-
ular, their theoretical framework allows us to present a notion of no-arbitrage
gains that is directly suggested by the popular aphorism, “there are no prof-
itable opportunities without cost or risk”. As such, it is both appealing and
extremely simple: a portfolio with zero cost and zero risk has a zero return.
Such an assumption is strictly weaker than the more elaborate asymptotic
no-arbitrage assumption common in the conventional APT literature, and
unlike it, both necessary and sufficient for an APT asset-pricing formula to
hold.
A Fubini extension is formally introduced as a probability space that
extends the usual product space and retains a Fubini property. Our result is
based on the model developed by Khan and Sun (2003) and the contribution
is to generalize their factor model indexed by a Loeb space to a new setting,
where the joint asset and sample spaces are modelled by a Fubini extension.
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3.2 CAPM and APT
3.2.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model
The CAMP is an asset pricing model that emphasizes that an asset’s risk
premium is determined by the its undivesifiable(essential) risk. In CAMP, an
asset’s essential risk is measured by its covariance with the market portfolio
and is called beta.
Assumptions of CAPM are as follows:
¦ All investors have rational expectations.
¦ There are no arbitrage opportunities.
¦ Returns are distributed normally.
¦ Fixed quantity of assets.
¦ Perfectly efficient capital markets.
¦ Separation of financial and production sectors.
¦ Risk-free rates exist with limitless borrowing capacity and universal access.
¦ The Risk-free borrowing and lending rates are equal.
¦ No inflation and no change in the level of interest rate exists.
¦ Perfect information, hence all investors have the same expectations about
security returns for any given time period.
Given these situations, we can define the market portfolio, denoted as
pM , as the portfolio (normalized to have unit cost) formed by summing the
investments of all investors. Suppose all investors choose portfolios that
belongs to the interval [m,c]. Thus, pM is a linear combination of portfolios
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that belong to [m,c], and there are some coefficients α and γ such that,
pM = αm+ γc. (3.1)
In the following, we show that the CAPM pricing equation is a conse-
quence of equation (3.1). Further, there is, to some extent, an equivalent
relation between them.
Define βp = cov(p, pM)/V (pM). The CAPM pricing equation asserts that
there exist constants a and b such that, for any portfolio p,
E(p) = aC(p) + bβp. (3.2)
This is not the usual form of CAPM. However, (3.2) can be rewritten as
E(q)− aC(q) = bβq, (3.3)
which implies that an asset’s risk premium is proportional to its beta. To
specify the coefficient a and b of (3.3), suppose that there is a riskless asset.
Let q be this riskless asset in (3.3). Since βq is zero then, it turns out that
a = E(q)/C(q) = ρ, the rate of return on the riskless asset. Now let q be the
market portfolio pM . Then βq = 1 and it follows that b = E(pM)−ρC(pM) =
E(pM)− ρ, since the market portfolio is normalized to have unit cost. Thus,
we may write (3.3) as,
E(q)− ρC(q) = βq(E(pM)− ρ).
If merely the unit cost portfolio in market are considered, i.e., C(q) = 1,
then we can get the following equation,
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E(q)− ρ = cov(q, pM)/V (pM)(E(pM)− ρ), (3.4)
which is the celebrated capital asset pricing model. In case that there is
no riskless asset, (3.4) still holds when ρ is interpreted as the rate of return
on a zero beta portfolio which is uncorrelated with the market portfolio.
The following two propositions show the close relation between the ex-
istence of the mean-variance efficient market portfolio and CAPM pricing
formula (See Rothchild(1986)).
Proposition 4 If pM ∈ [m, c] and there exits two unit cost portfolio p and
q such that βp 6= βq, then (3.2) holds.
Proof: This is nothing but simple arithmetic. (3.1) implies that
(pM , q) = (αm+ γc, q) = α(m, q) + γ(c, q) = αE(q) + γC(q),
On the other hand,
(pM , q) = cov(pM , q) + E(pM)E(q),
Combining the above two equations,
cov(pM , q) = E(q)(α− E(pM)) + γC(q).
Hence
βq = cov(q, pM)/V (pM) = (E(q)(α− E(pM)) + γC(q))/V (pM). (3.5)
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Now if α = E(pM), (3.5) implies that βq = γC(q))/V (pM), so all the unit
cost portfolios have the same beta γ/V (pM); thus we can assume α 6= E(pM).
By substituting (3.5) into (3.2) and comparing the coefficient of E(q) and
C(q), we get that a = −γ/(α− E(pM)) and b = V (pM)/(α− E(pM)).
The following is a converse of proposition 4.
Proposition 5 Equation 3.2 implies that pM ∈ [m, c].
Proof: Let q be a portfolio that is orthogonal to [m,c]. Then we have
E(q) = (m, q) = 0 and C(q) = (c, q) = 0.
Thus (3.2) implies that βq = 0. Then
(q, pM) = E(q)E(pM) + βq = 0,
which means that q is orthogonal to pM as well.
CAPM seems to do a good job of explaining relationships among asset
prices. It measures the risk of a certain asset effectively by indicating its
correlation with the market portfolio. However, it has been under strong
criticism because of its dubious empirical content. Casual observation is
sufficient to refute one of the main implications of the CAPM-that every-
one holds the market portfolio. Therefore, we will next study the arbitrage
pricing theory (APT) developed by Ross which is an alternative theory to
CAPM.
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3.2.2 Ross’s Arbitrage Pricing Theory
The theory was initiated by the economist Stephen Ross in 1976. APT holds
that the expected return of a financial asset can be modelled as a linear func-
tion of various macro-economic factors or theoretical market indices, where
sensitivity to changes in each factor is represented by a factor specific beta
coefficient.
Note that there are some assumptions and requirements that have to be
fulfilled for the latter to be correct:
¦ The market should not permit arbitrage opportunities.
¦ The market has a factor structure.
¦ There are a large number of assets.
¦ The total number of factors may never surpass the total number of assets
(in order to avoid the problem of matrix singularity).
As we mentioned above , the returns on assets here are assumed to have a
K-factor structure. The phenomenon that a factor structure tries to capture
is that the covariance matrix
∑
n can be approximated by a simpler, lower
dimensional structure.
Definition 7 A financial market is said to have a strict K-structure if the
random return on the ith asset is generated by
xi = µi + βi1f1 + ...+ βiKfK + ei,
where the factors f1, f2, ...fK are orthogonal to the idiosyncratic distur-
bances ei, and have zero mean, unit variance. The ei are also orthogonal to
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each other, assumed to have zero means and there exists 0 < ζ < ∞ such
that V (ei) ≤ ζ <∞ for all i.
If the market has an strict factor structure, then for any finite subset IF
of I, the maximal eigenvalue of the covariance matrix is certainly less than ζ.
The following theorem , which generalizes the result of Ross (1976), is thus
obvious.
Theorem 14 If there is no arbitrage in a market with a strict factor struc-
ture, then there exist real numbers τ1, τ2, ..., τK such that
∞∑
i=1
(µi − ρ− τ1βi1 − ...− τKβiK)2 <∞. (3.6)
The assumption of the strict factor structure seems overly strong, how-
ever. In fact, we can replace the strict condition by a much more general
one, which allows for correlation among the idiosyncratic components of the
asset returns. This is the so called approximate K-factor structure.
Definition 8 A financial market is said to have an approximate factor struc-
ture if there exists a positive real number M such that for any finite subset
IF of I, the maximal eigenvalue of the covariance matrix ΣIF of {ei}i∈IF is
less than M .
The following theorem (See Khan and Sun(2001)), which generalized
Chamberlain and Rothchild ’s result(1983) into a financial market with a
general index set, shows that an approximate factor structure is sufficient for
Ross’s result.
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Theorem 15 If there is no arbitrage in a market with an approximate factor
structure, then there exist real numbers τ1, τ2, ..., τK such that
∞∑
i=1
(µi − ρ− τ1βi1 − ...− τKβiK)2 <∞.
3.2.3 Relationship of CAPM and APT
The APT along with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is one of two
influential theories on asset pricing. The APT differs from the CAPM in
that it is less restrictive in its assumptions. It allows for an explanatory
(as opposed to statistical) model of asset returns. It assumes that each
investor will hold a unique portfolio with its own particular array of betas,
as opposed to the identical “market portfolio”. In some ways, the CAPM can
be considered a “special case” of the APT in that the securities market line
represents a single-factor model of the asset price, where Beta is exposure to
changes in value of the Market.
Additionally, the APT can be seen as a “supply side” model, since its
beta coefficients reflect the sensitivity of the underlying asset to economic
factors. Thus, factor shocks would cause structural changes in the asset’s
expected return, or in the case of stocks, in the firm’s profitability.
On the other side, the capital asset pricing model is considered a “demand
side” model. Its results, although similar to those in the APT, arise from
a maximization problem of each investor’s utility function, and from the
resulting market equilibrium (investors are considered to be the “consumers”
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of the assets).
3.3 Fubini Extension
Now we will formally introduce the concept of the Fubini extension(See Khan
and Sun (2003) for details), which will be used as the index of our model.
Let probability spaces (I, I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ) be our index and sample spaces
respectively. Let (I×Ω, I⊗F , λ⊗P ) be the usual product probability space.
The following result shows that independence and joint measurability with
respect to the usual measure-theoretic product are never compatible with
each other except for the trivial case that almost all random variables are
essentially constant. It also means that even if one chooses a very large
σ-algebra on the index space I of a nontrivial independent process so that
all the sample functions are measurable, the process itself is still not jointly
measurable with respect to I⊗F . For a function f on I×Ω, and (i, ω) ∈ I×Ω,
fi represents the function f(i, ·) on Ω, and fω the function f(·, ω) on I.
Proposition 6 Let f be a function from I × Ω to a Polish space X (i.e., a
topological space that is homeomorphic to a complete separable metric space).
If f is jointly measurable on the product probability space (I×Ω, I⊗F , λ£P ),
and for λ-almost all s ∈ I, fs is independent of fi for λ-almost all i ∈ I (this
condition is called essential pairwise independence), then for λ-almost all
i ∈ I, fi is a constant random variables.
The Fubini type property associated with joint measurability is simply an
idealization of changing the order of summation signs in the discrete setting,
3.3 Fubini Extension 45
and this property should be retained as far as possible for a meaningful study
of independent processes. To resolve the incompatibility of independence and
joint measurability with respect to the usual measure-theoretic product, one
can work with a probability space (I × Ω,W , Q) that extends the usual
product probability space (I ×Ω, I ⊗F , λ⊗ P ) and retains the Fubini type
property. Here is a formal definition.
Definition 9 A probability space (I ×Ω,W , Q) extending the usual product
space (I × Ω, I ⊗ F , λ ⊗ P ) is said to be a Fubini extension of (I × Ω, I ⊗
F , λ⊗ P ) if for any real-valued Q-integrable function f on (I × Ω,W),
(1) the two functions fi and fω are integrable respectively on (Ω,F , P )

























One thing we need to point is that the classical Fubini Theorem is only
stated for the usual product measure spaces. It does not apply to integrable
functions on (I×Ω,W , Q) since these functions may not be I⊗F -measurable.
However, the conclusions of that theorem do hold for processes on the en-
riched product space (I × Ω,W , Q) that extends the usual product.
To reflect the fact that the probability space (I × Ω,W , Q) has (I, I, λ)
and (Ω,F , P ) as its marginal spaces, as required by the Fubini property, it
will be denoted by (I×Ω, I£F , λ£P ). There are Fubini extensions in which
one can construct measurable processes with essentially pairwise independent
random variables taking any given variety of distributions. Such measurable
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processes can only exist in a strict extension of the usual product probability
space, as shown in Proposition 6.
The following lemma is a generalized version of the Fubini property for a
Fubini extension.
Lemma 1 Let g and h be real-valued square integrable processes on a Fubini
extension (I×Ω, I£F , λ£P ). Define a real-valued function G on I× I×Ω
by letting G(s, i, ω) = g(s, ω)h(i, ω) for (s, i, ω) ∈ I × I × Ω. Then
(i) For λ-almost all s ∈ I, λ-almost all i ∈ I, the function G(s, i, ·) on Ω
is P -integrable.
(ii) For λ-almost all s ∈ I, the function ∫
Ω
G(s, i, ω)dP (ω) in terms of






























Proof: (i) The Fubini property implies that for λ-almost all s ∈ I, λ-almost
all i ∈ I, both the functions gs(ω) and hi(ω) in terms of ω ∈ Ω are P -square
integrable; and hence the product G(s, i, ω) = g(s, ω)h(i, ω) is P -integrable
on Ω.
(ii) Any real-valued function ϕ that is P -square integrable on Ω is still
square integrable on (I ×Ω, I £F , λ£P ); and thus the product ϕ(ω)h(i, ω)
is integrable on (I × Ω, I £ F , λ£ P ).
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For λ-almost all s ∈ I, gs is P -square integrable; and hence the product
gs(ω)h(i, ω) is integrable on (I × Ω, I £ F , λ £ P ). The Fubini property
implies that for λ-almost all s ∈ I, the function ∫
Ω
G(s, i, ω)dP (ω) in terms
























h(i, ω)dλ(i) is integrable on (I × Ω, I £ F , λ £ P ). The Fubini





























h(i, ω)dλ(i) are P -square integrable,
















and we are done.
Next is a formal definition of essential uncorrelatedness in the setting of
a Fubini extension.
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Definition 10 Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I×Ω, I£
F , λ £ P ). The random variables fi are said to be essentially uncorrelated,
if for λ-almost all s ∈ I, fs is uncorrelated with fi for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Proposition 7 shows that it is very simple to obtain an exact law of large
numbers in terms of sample means in the framework of a Fubini extension.
In particular, it shows that if a square integrable process is essentially un-
correlated, then its sample means are essentially constant.
Proposition 7 Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I×Ω, I£
F , λ £ P ). If the random variables fi are essentially uncorrelated, then for
P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, the sample mean Efω =
∫
I
fωdλ is the same as the mean
of the process Ef =
∫
I×Ω fdλ£ P .
Proof: Define real-valued square integrable processes g and h on (I×Ω, I£
F , λ£P ) by letting g(i, ω) = h(i, ω) = f(i, ω)−Efi for any (i, ω) ∈ I×Ω.
Then, for λ-almost all s ∈ I, λ-almost all i ∈ I, ∫
Ω
gs(ω)hi(ω)dP (ω) = 0.







h(i, ω)dλ(i)dP (ω) =
∫
Ω
(Efω − Ef)2dP (ω) = 0,
which implies Efω = Ef for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
3.4 Exact Arbitrage and Asset Pricing on a
Fubini Extension
We first recall some basic definitions. Let (T, T , λ) an atomless probability
space, to be used as the index set of assets. We work with another atomless
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measure space (Ω,A, P ) as the sample space, a space that formalizes all
possible uncertain social or natural states relevant to the asset market. Here
we use the Fubini extension denoted by (T ×Ω, T £A, λ£P ) instead of the
usual product space (T ×Ω, T ⊗A, λ⊗P ). The new space retains the Fubini
property and is therefore rich enough for the study of idiosyncratic risks. As
is conventional, we shall refer to a measurable function of two variables as a
process. Given a process g on the product space, for each t ∈ T , and each
ω ∈ Ω, gt denotes the function g(t, ·) on Ω and gω denotes the function g(·, ω)
on T . The functions gt are usually called the random variables of the process
g, while the gω are referred to as the sample functions of the process. Since
the measure λ£ P is an extension of λ⊗ P on the usual product σ-algebra
T ⊗A to the larger product σ-algebra T £A. We emphasize that we always
work with the larger product σ-algebra T £A.
We shall model the financial market by a real-valued T £A-measurable
function x on T×Ω, and interpret the real-valued random variable xt defined
on (Ω,A, P ) as the one-period random return to an asset t in T. In order to
use the notion of the variance of the return to any asset, we shall assume that
the asset return process x has a finite second moment, and therefore belongs
to the Hilbert space L2(λ£ P ) of real-valued square integrable functions on





x2(t, ω)dλ£ P (t, ω) < ∞. (3.9)
Let µ be the mean function of the random variables embodied in the
process x of asset returns, which is to say that µ(t) =
∫
Ω
x(t, ω)dP (ω) is the
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x2(t, ω)dλ£ P (t, ω) <∞, (3.10)
and hence µ is λ-square integrable and belongs to the Hilbert space L2(λ).
The centered process f, defined by f(t, ω) = x(t, ω) − µ(t), embodies the
unexpected or the net random return of all the assets, and is also λ £ P -
square integrable.
A portfolio is simply a function listing the amounts held of each asset.
Since short sales are allowed, this function can take negative values. The
cost of each asset is assumed to be unity, and hence the cost of a particular
portfolio is simply its integral with respect to λ. Since we are interested in the
mean and variance of the return realized from a portfolio, we shall assume
it to be a square integrable function. The random return from a particular
portfolio then depends on the random return, and the amounts held in the
portfolio, of each asset t ∈ T. Formally,
Definition 11 A portfolio is a square integrable function p on (T, T , λ). The
cost C(p) of a portfolio p is given by (p, 1) =
∫
T
p(t)dλ(t). The random return
of the portfolio p is given by Rp(ω) = (p, xω) =
∫
T
p(t)x(t, ω)dλ(t). The mean
(or the expected return) E(p) and the variance V (p) of the portfolio p are the
mean and the variance of the random return Rp respectively.
Heuristically, dλ(t) is interpreted as an infinitesimal amount of an asset t
and can be regarded as a small accounting unit in some sense. Thus, in the
portfolio p, p(t)dλ(t) is the amount, and p(t)x(t, ω)dλ(t) is the return, of
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shares of asset t ∈ T. For any two assets, s and t in T, p(s) and p(t) measure
their relative amounts in the portfolio p. Since these terms are integrable
as a function of t over an atomless measure space, the amount invested in,
and the return pertaining to, any asset is infinitesimal, and therefore any
portfolio is well-diversified automatically.
We now turn to the decomposition of an asset’s return into systematic
and unsystematic (synonymously, factor and idiosyncratic) risks.
3.4.1 Systematic and Unsystematic Risks: A Bi-variate
Decomposition
We begin by noting the interesting fact that the completion of the stan-
dard product measure space corresponding to the standard measure spaces
(T, T , λ) and (Ω,A, P ), is always strictly contained in a Fubini extension
(T × Ω, T £ A, λ £ P ). For simplicity, let U denote the product σ-algebra
T £ A. For an integrable real-valued process g on a Fubini extension, let
E(g|U) denote the conditional expectation of g with respect to U . This
conditional expectation is a key operation, and used here to formalize the
ensemble of systematic risks and unsystematic risks, and thereby to model
uncertainty from both the macroscopic and microscopic points of view. It
makes rigorous the pervasive attempts in the economic literature that use a
discrete or continuous parameter process with low intercorrelation to model
individual uncertainty, and then to invoke the law of large numbers to remove
this individual uncertainty.
Now we state our factor model. It is extended from the result of Khan
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and Sun(2003).
Theorem 16 Let f be a real-valued square integrable centered process on a
Fubini extension (T ×Ω, T £A, λ£P ). Then f has the following expression:




λnψn(t)ϕn(ω) + e(t, ω),
with properties:
(i) λn, 1 ≤ n < ∞ is a decreasing sequence of positive numbers; the
collection {ψn : 1 ≤ n < ∞} is orthonormal; and {ϕn : 1 ≤ n < ∞} is a
collection of orthonormal and centered random variables.
(ii) E(f |U)(t, ω) =
∑∞
n=1 λnψn(t)ϕn(ω) and E(e|U) = 0.
(iii) The random variables et are almost surely orthogonal, which is to say
that for λ-almost all t1 ∈ T, λ-almost all t2 ∈ T,∫
Ω
et1(ω)et2(ω)dP (ω) = 0 holds.
(iv) If p is a square integrable real-valued function on (T, T , λ), then for
P -almost all ω ∈ Ω,∫
T












(v) If α is a square integrable random variable on (Ω,A, P ), then for λ-almost
all t ∈ T, it is orthogonal to et, and∫
Ω
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Definition 12 A centered random variable α on the sample space Ω is said
to be an unsystematic risk for a financial market x if α has finite variance
and is uncorrelated to xt for λ-almost all t ∈ T .
Definition 13 A centered random variable β on the sample space Ω is said
to be a systematic risk for a financial market x if β has finite variance and
is in the linear space F spanned by all the factors ϕn, n ≥ 1.
In summary, a given risk γ can be additively decomposed into an element
β in the endogenously identified space F , and an element α in its orthogonal
complement – Definitions 12 and 13 simply provide a crystallization of the
common intuition that generally one can divide risks into a systematic and
an unsystematic portion.
We conclude this subsection by presenting an optimality property of the
endogenously extracted factors.




1, bi ∈ L2(P ) with
∫
Ω























The minimum is achieved at µi = λi, ai = ψi, bi = ϕi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If
λm is an eigenvalue of unit multiplicity, and if the minimum is achieved by∑m
i=1 µiai(t)bi(ω) ≡ β(t, ω), then β(t, ω) =
∑m
n=1 λnϕn(ω)ψn(t).
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3.4.2 Exact Arbitrage and APT
We begin with a precise formulation of such an assumption; namely, the
common-sensical assertion that a riskless and costless portfolio earns a zero
rate of return.
Definition 14 A market does not permit exact arbitrage opportunities if for
any portfolio p, V (p) = C(p) = 0 implies E(p) = 0.
We are now ready to state a theorem on the equivalence of the validity
of an APT type pricing formula with the economic principle of no arbitrage.
Theorem 17 A market does not permit exact arbitrage opportunities if and
only if there is a sequence {τn}∞n=0 of real numbers such that for λ-almost all
t ∈ T , µt = τ0 +
∑∞
n=1 τnψn(t).
Proof: We begin with necessity. For an arbitrary portfolio p, let pr be the
projection of p on the closed subspace spanned by the constant function (3.9)
and all the ψn. Denote ps = p−pr. Since µ ∈ L2(λ) from (3.10) above, we can
also project it on the same closed subspace, and define µr and µs accordingly.
If p is costless and riskless, then it is clear from Definition 11 above that p is









Thus, no arbitrage means that
∫
T
ps(t)µs(t)dλ(t) = 0 for any ps, and in
particular, it is true when ps = µs. Hence, we obtain
∫
T
µ2s(t)dλ = 0, and
thus µs(t) = 0 for λ-almost all t ∈ T . By the definition of µr, there are real
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numbers {τn}∞n=0 such that µ(t) = µr(t) = τ0+
∑∞
n=1 τnψn(t) for λ-almost all
t ∈ T .
On the other hand, for the sufficiency part of the claim, the validity of
the arbitrage pricing formula clearly implies µs = 0, which also furnishes us
the no arbitrage condition.
As defined in the above proof, µs is the orthogonal complement of µ on
the subspace spanned by the constant function (3.9) together with all the
factor loadings ψn. The following corollary is obvious.
Corollary 1 A market does not permit exact arbitrage opportunities if and
only if µs = 0.
If one is only allowed to use finitely many factors among countably many
factors, then the following obvious corollary says that one can still obtain an
approximate APT pricing result.
Corollary 2 If a market does not permit exact arbitrage opportunities, there
is a sequence {τn}∞n=0 of real numbers such that limk→∞ ‖µt−τ0−(
∑k
n=1 τnψn(t))‖2 =
0, where ‖ · ‖ is the norm in the Hilbert space L2(λ).
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